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Abstract The chapter analyzes the rationales for excluding relevant evidence with
the aim of establishing the ideal type of exclusion system for each rationale. The
authors then review to what extent individual legal systems have actually altered
their legal rules in accordance with these ideal systems. An investigation into
whether or not there are any consistent relationships between the ideal systems and
proclaimed rationales is conducted. The structure of various exclusionary rules is
also explored, as are other factors that may influence the law and practical appli-
cation of such rules.
1 Introduction
The exclusion of relevant evidence from the trial interferes with one of the main
goals of the criminal process, that is, the determination of all relevant facts (“the
truth”) as the basis of the verdict. For that reason, many criminal justice systems,
both adversarial and inquisitorial, have long viewed rules demanding the exclusion
of relevant evidence (“exclusionary rules”) as an obstacle to the search for truth and
therefore have greatly limited their application. Over the course of the twentieth
century, however, the use of exclusionary rules has increased signiﬁcantly. More
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and more legal systems decided to use exclusion of evidence as a reaction to
violations of rules concerning the acquisition of evidence.1
In adversarial systems, exclusion can be based on the logic that a party which
obtains a piece of evidence illegally should not be allowed to beneﬁt from the fruits
of the violation. In inquisitorial systems, it is more difﬁcult to rely on this rationale
of exclusion because evidence is regarded as “belonging” to the court, not to one of
the parties. Still, there are overriding concerns that may justify a court’s decision to
exclude a piece of evidence. Such concerns can be related to systemic interests
(e.g., the appearance of fairness) or individual interests (e.g., vindication of the
rights of the individual affected by the violation). Each of these interests may be so
important as to outweigh the procedural interest in having the full range of relevant
evidence available at the trial.
Every legal system recognizes exclusionary rules as a reaction to particularly
serious violations. There is an almost universal rule that statements made as a result
of torture must not be used in court.2 But beyond this common core, the breadth and
contents of exclusionary rules differ widely. In some jurisdictions, the law generally
prohibits the admission of any evidence obtained illegally.3 Other states are more
reticent and recognize only a limited number of “absolute” exclusionary rules,
leaving exclusion in other cases to the discretion of the court, or permitting the
admission of illegally obtained evidence if the interest in making use of it for
“ﬁnding the truth” outweighs the taint of its illegal acquisition.
At the same time, legal systems differ with respect to the purposes they proclaim
to pursue by excluding illegally obtained evidence. In some systems, the integrity of
fact-ﬁnding or of the judicial system as such is the most prominent concern that
supports the exclusion of evidence. In other systems, deterrence of police mis-
conduct is foremost. In yet others, the principal justiﬁcation for exclusion rests on
the protection of individual rights. The general tendency toward protecting human
rights that has prevailed in the last few decades has given a boost to such
considerations.
In this chapter, we will start out by analyzing the potential rationales for
excluding relevant evidence (Sect. 2) and will then attempt to construe ideal types
of exclusion systems based on each rationale (Sect. 3). We will then review to what
extent individual legal systems have actually devised their legal rules in accordance
with these ideal types (Sect. 4). By way of conclusion, we will ask whether there is
any consistent relationship between the ideal types based on the proclaimed
1This chapter focuses on illegally obtained evidence and therefore does not discuss rules that some
legal systems use to exclude evidence in order to “absolutely” protect speciﬁc interests, e.g., the
core of the right to privacy, even in the absence of police misconduct.
2Art. 15 UN Convention against Torture (1984) (“Each State Party shall ensure that any statement
which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in
any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was
made.”).
3Greece is an example of such an absolutist approach to exclusion. See Giannoulopoulos, 2007,
p. 181.
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rationales and the actual conﬁguration of exclusionary rules, and what other factors
may in fact influence the law and practice of excluding evidence (Sect. 5).
2 Rationales of Exclusionary Rules
In this chapter, we review the most common rationales used to support the
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. We will ﬁrst deal with system-related
considerations, such as promoting the search for truth and the integrity of the
criminal justice system. We will then examine deterrence of police misconduct and
protection of individual rights as justiﬁcations for excluding evidence.
2.1 Finding the Truth
In order to properly fulﬁl its functions, any procedural system, regardless of
whether it is party-oriented or court-centered, must meet certain basic requirements:
A functional procedural system needs to present courts as principally fair and
oriented toward a just disposition of cases in accordance with the law; this includes
an orientation of fact-ﬁnding toward the “truth”, or more realistically, a renunciation
of court decisions based on evident ﬁction. Courts are encouraged to pursue these
basic goals through admitting and taking into consideration any evidence that
appears to be factually relevant for the disposition of the case.
Yet in exceptional situations, the introduction of individual pieces of evidence
may fatally undermine the integrity of the proceedings. For example, basing a
conviction on a confession that the defendant made under torture not only conflicts
with the ideal of judicial integrity but also raises doubts as to the court’s
truth-orientation, because torture tends to make the victim say anything that he
thinks will put an end to the pain. Evidence may therefore be excluded if the
methods used to obtain it have rendered it unreliable.4 This rationale applies to the
suppression of verbal statements obtained as a result of torture or, in some cases,
deceit of the person questioned or the inability to confront key witnesses.5
The reliability-based rationale has a limited area of application, however. It
rarely comes into play with regard to physical evidence. When drugs are seized
illegally or a telephone conversation is taped without a necessary judicial warrant,
the unlawful government action does not in any way reduce these items’ probative
value. Therefore, excluding such evidence would undermine the search for truth
instead of advancing it.
4Jackson/Summers, 2012, at 154.
5Macula, 2019 at 3; R v. Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353, § 110 (Can.); Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate 1954
JC 66, 83 (Scot.); Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4
May 2006, CrimA 5121/98, § 71 (Justice Beinisch); Strafprozessordnung (Ger.) § 136a.
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2.2 Upholding Judicial Integrity
A broader justiﬁcation for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is the
preservation of the integrity of the judicial system.6 This rationale assumes that
courts would taint their own reputation and dignity if they (routinely) base their
decisions on evidence that has been obtained through gross violations of the law.
Courts should therefore exclude tainted evidence in order to demonstrate to the
public that they do not condone illegal acts of government agents and that they
refuse to base their decisions on the results of such acts. By declining to become
“accomplices in the willful disobedience of [the law] they are sworn to uphold”7
and by renouncing the use of illegally obtained evidence, courts reafﬁrm the rule of
law and buttress the legitimacy of criminal proceedings.8
To the extent the integrity rationale emphasizes the integrity of the individual
judicial process, it tends to support robust, categorical approaches to exclusion. But
in another variant of this rationale, also known as “systemic integrity,” the focus is
more broadly on “not bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.”9 This
version of the integrity rationale recognizes that while exclusionary rules may
contribute to the propriety of the criminal process, they can also undermine the
acceptance of the criminal justice system if they lead to the non-prosecution or
6See, e.g., ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany, case no. 22978/05, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 1 June
2010, § 175 (“Indeed, there is also a vital public interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial
process and thus the values of civilised societies founded upon the rule of law.”). Like other courts
and writers, the ECtHR here refers not only to “the integrity of the judicial process” but also to the
“rule of law.” The latter is a very basic value of any judicial system. However, exclusion of
evidence does not speciﬁcally promote the “rule of law,” because the law can provide for different
ways of dealing with illegally obtained evidence. By contrast, “the integrity of the judicial process”
(or, for short, “judicial integrity”) describes the speciﬁc interest potentially violated by admitting
tainted evidence.
7Elkins v. United States, 364 US 206, 223 (1960); see also Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v.
Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May 2006, CrimA 5121/98 (Justice Beinisch), § 45
(“[T]he administration of justice is also based on the way in which the court reaches its decision in
the circumstances of the case before it. Basing a conviction on evidence that was obtained in an
illegal manner or by means of a substantial violation of a protected human right allows the
investigation authorities to enjoy the fruits of their misdeed and it may create an incentive for
improper acts of interrogation in the future. Admitting such evidence may be seen as the court
giving approval to the aforesaid illegality and being an accessory, albeit after the event, to the
improper conduct of the investigation authorities. Consequently, in certain circumstances admit-
ting the evidence in court may prejudice the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.”).
8This rationale has been particularly influential in countries emerging from authoritarian regimes
and transitioning to liberal democracy. In those countries, the exclusionary rule has been valued
for curtailing government abuse and for afﬁrming that even government ofﬁcials are subject to
legal restraints. See Turner, 2014.
9Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 24 (U.K.) (“[T]he evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”); R v. Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353, §§ 68–70
(Can.).
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acquittal of persons who are most likely to be guilty of serious crime. The public
may lose faith in the proper functioning of the system if courts frequently exclude
reliable evidence and consequently fail to convict because crucial evidence is then
missing.
The systemic integrity approach therefore favors a balancing of factors reflecting
these competing interests. On the one hand, courts should examine the seriousness
of the ofﬁcial misconduct, including the culpability of the ofﬁcers, the presence of a
pattern of misconduct, and the signiﬁcance of the right violated; on the other hand,
to determine the costs of exclusion, courts should consider the gravity of the offense
charged, the reliability of the evidence, and the centrality of the evidence to the case
against the defendant.10
2.3 Deterring Police Misconduct
One aspect of promoting the integrity of the criminal process concerns the influence
that exclusion of evidence may have on police conduct. In the great majority of
procedural systems, most investigation work is performed by police ofﬁcers, and it
is often they who break the rules concerning the acquisition of evidence. The
integrity aspect of criminal procedure is therefore most vulnerable on the police
level.11 Accordingly, one function of excluding illegally obtained evidence is to
dissuade law enforcement ofﬁcers from violating the law.12
Exclusion for “deterrence” purposes is based on the assumption that police
ofﬁcers, even if they are not at all times focused on respecting procedural safe-
guards, have a strong professional interest in seeing offenders convicted. By
excluding evidence that the ofﬁcer had acquired in violation of the law and thereby
dramatically reducing the odds of conviction, courts hope to nudge police ofﬁcers
toward complying with the law in the future. It is not by chance that the notion of
excluding evidence for the purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct has played
a great role in the United States, following revelations of grave and systematic
police violations of suspects’ rights in the U.S. legal system in the 1960s.13
Exclusion of evidence obtained through the use of illegal police methods was seen
as an indispensable means for re-establishing the integrity and public acceptance of
the criminal justice system.
10See Slobogin, 2016 at 287–291.
11In Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 320 (1959), the U.S. Supreme Court explained its new
emphasis on police illegality used to obtain the confession (rather than on the inherent untrust-
worthiness of coerced confessions): “[t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary con-
fessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”
12United States v. Leon, 468 US 897, 918 (1984); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591 (2006);
Herring v. United States, 555 US 135 (2009).
13Miller/Wright, 2007 at 521–522 (discussing the ﬁndings of the Wickersham Commission).
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More recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that the social
costs of exclusion may outweigh the beneﬁts of deterrence.14 As part of this
cost-beneﬁt analysis, the Court has taken into account the availability of alternative
sanctions that may be able to discipline ofﬁcers at a lesser cost to the administration
of justice.15 It has further limited the applicability of the deterrence rationale by
declaring that deterrence can operate only where police ofﬁcers violate procedural
rules deliberately or recklessly.16
Although prominent in the United States, the deterrence approach has not gained
much of a following elsewhere. To the extent deterrence of police misconduct is
mentioned by European courts, it is typically used as a secondary consideration
supporting other purposes of exclusion.17 In Germany, a few authors have recog-
nized deterrence of police misconduct as one purpose of excluding illegally
obtained evidence18; but the majority have rejected that approach, arguing that this
rationale does not ﬁt the inquisitorial structure of the German criminal process and
would interfere too much with the courts’ mandate to search for the truth.19
The skepticism toward the idea of deterring police misconduct by excluding
evidence from trial may be well-founded. There exists at best a tenuous psycho-
logical connection between excluding evidence of past misconduct and preventing
future ones: the mechanism of “deterrence” can function only if: (a) offending
police ofﬁcers are informed of the forensic fate of the individual criminal process,
and (b) they care about that fate. The empirical foundations of either precondition is
doubtful, however.20 Especially if police use torture or other unlawful means for
purposes other than obtaining evidence to be used in criminal proceedings (e.g.,
because they wish to humiliate members of an ethnic group or because they are
looking for information unrelated to criminal proceedings), the fact that statements
obtained through their acts are inadmissible at trial will have little influence on their
behavior.
14United States v. Leon, 468 US 897, 907 (1984); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591, 599
(2006); Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 141 (2009).
15Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591, 599 (2006).
16Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 144 (2009).
17See, e.g., Macula, 2019 at 3.1.1.
18See Grünwald, 1966 at 499–500; Spendel, 1966 at 1104–1105.
19Küpper, 1990 at 417; Jäger, 2003 at 69–71.
20Alschuler, 2008 at 1374 (reviewing U.S. studies of the exclusionary rule’s deterrence effect and
concluding that while the exclusionary rule does not have a direct and immediate deterrent effect
on ofﬁcers’ behavior, it “works over the long term by allowing judges to give guidance to police
ofﬁcers who ultimately prove willing to receive it”).
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2.4 Human Rights Considerations
An alternative approach to justifying the exclusion of relevant evidence aims at the
protection of human rights.21 Exclusion, according to this rationale, is to provide
the victims of human rights violations with an effective remedy. This rationale has
been influential in several of the countries studied in this volume, including
Germany, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The U.S. Supreme Court followed this
approach in some of its earlier opinions on the exclusionary rule, explaining that
without exclusion, provisions that protect fundamental rights would be reduced to
“a form of words”22 and would not have any meaningful legal effect.23 Yet, the US
Supreme Court has since abandoned this rationale and has switched to an emphasis
on deterrence of police misconduct.24
Regional human rights courts, by contrast, have in recent years begun to prod
states to provide for exclusion of evidence obtained through human rights viola-
tions. Human rights law requires states to ensure the protection of, inter alia, the
right to a fair trial,25 the right to be free from arbitrary searches and seizures,26 the
right to privacy,27 and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself.28
The domestic implementation of provisions protecting human rights has made
states aware of the need to adopt mechanisms that can effectively safeguard these
rights. Human rights courts tend to leave questions of the admissibility of evidence
to individual states and do not generally require that evidence be excluded if
gathered in violation of one of these rights.29 But they mandate exclusion of
statements obtained through serious violations of fair trial such as entrapment of
innocent citizens to commit crimes,30 torture or degrading treatment,31 and in the
Inter-American human rights regime, even of statements obtained through lesser
21Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May 2006,
CrimA 5121/98 (Justice Beinisch), § 61; Ashworth, 1977; Jackson/Summers, 2012, at 155.
22Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 US 385, 392 (1920).
23Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383, 393 (1914).
24Id.
25ICCPR art. 14(1); ECHR art. 6.
26ICCPR art. 17; ECHR art. 8.
27ICCPR art. 17; ECHR art. 8.
28ICCPR art. 14(3); ECHR art. 8.
29See, e.g., ECtHR, Khan v. United Kingdom, case no. 35394/97, Judgment of 12 May 2000, (31
Eur. Ct. H.R. 45), § 34.
30See, e.g., ECtHR, Furcht v. Germany, case no. 54648/09, Judgment of 23 October 2014, §§ 62–64.
31ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany, case no. 22978/05, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 1 June 2010, §§
166–168; see UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 15.
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forms of coercion.32 Human rights law has thus, directly as well as indirectly,
contributed to the expansion of exclusionary rules designed to protect human rights.
However, the functional relationship between the exclusion of evidence and the
protection of human rights is less than clear. One can conceive of exclusion as a
mechanism for preventing future human rights violations; exclusion is to demon-
strate to potential violators that it is not worthwhile to use torture or other prohibited
methods because evidence obtained thereby will not be admissible in court. This is
the logic of deterrence of police misconduct, which we have mentioned above
(Sect. 2.3). But it is an open question whether (and why) the criminal justice system
should be obliged to contribute to a better protection of human rights. Exclusion
may have an indirect positive effect on reducing human rights violations, but its
undeniable direct effect is a reduction of the factual basis on which the court’s
verdict can be based. It is thus the criminal justice system that has to pay the price
for the possible improvement in human rights protection.
The main argument in favor of exclusion from a human rights perspective is,
however, not systemic but individualistic: inadmissibility is to provide the victim of
the violation with some kind of compensation. This argument, however, suffers
from several flaws. First, compensation of this kind is provided only for a relatively
small portion of victims of human rights violations, i.e., those who are subsequently
subjected to a criminal trial. Second, exclusion can apply only if the human rights
violation produced evidence relevant to a criminal case. Third, exclusion of evi-
dence may give little satisfaction to the victim of a serious violation if the piece of
evidence in question is of little signiﬁcance to the outcome of the case and its
exclusion does not preclude conviction.33 In sum, exclusion of evidence affects
only a very small, fortuitously composed portion of victims of human rights vio-
lations, and even for that group, its compensatory effect is dubious.
On the other hand, acquittal of a serious offender may be over-compensation for
a minor violation of his procedural rights. For example, if an ofﬁcer conducts a car
search based on a good faith belief that she has sufﬁcient cause to do so, but a court
later disagrees and excludes a murder weapon seized in the search, so that the
defendant is acquitted for lack of evidence, acquittal may be seen as an
out-of-proportion reaction to the invasion of the defendant’s privacy. And even if
exclusion is not disproportionate—should the “criminal” go free because the con-
stable has blundered? The fact that a police ofﬁcer violated a defendant’s rights does
not in any way reduce the defendant’s blameworthiness for the act he committed;
and although he should be compensated for the violation of his rights, the exclusion
of relevant evidence lacks an inherent nexus with the injury the defendant suffered.
32American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(3) (“A confession of guilt by the accused shall be
valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind.”).
33For example, an intrusive bodily search of a suspect conducted by police without probable cause
and without a warrant may produce evidence of drug-dealing (i.e., the drugs themselves) that is
relevant but not crucial to the case against the suspect; its exclusion would hardly compensate the
victim of the illegal search for the harm done to him.
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The compensation rationale for the exclusion of evidence is, in sum, less than
convincing. It might be useful, on the basis of the above considerations, to limit
exclusion to instances in which the production of evidence in court would itself
violate a person’s human rights. This would be the case, for example, if the tran-
script of an illegally taped telephone conversation between the defendant and his
wife would be read in open court, because disclosing this conversation to the public
would be a new violation of the couple’s right to marital intimacy. By contrast, the
introduction of drugs discovered in the defendant’s car through an illegal war-
rantless search would not, by itself, violate the defendant’s human rights.
3 Ideal Types of Exclusionary Systems
In this section, we briefly sketch possible consequences of a system’s decision to
opt for one of the key exclusionary rule rationales discussed above: systemic
integrity, deterrence, or protecting human rights. We do this by constructing ideal
types of exclusionary regimes, that is, by postulating consequences from their
underlying purposes without taking into account the individual factual and nor-
mative conditions and limitations of any speciﬁc legal system. In deﬁning the ideal
types, we cannot deal with all details and possible ramiﬁcations of exclusionary
regimes; we will therefore focus on several key doctrinal questions that have the
potential of differentiating between systems and also have signiﬁcant practical
effect. In this regard, we will highlight ﬁve aspects of the application of exclu-
sionary rules: (a) whether there is a strict exclusionary rule or whether it is subject
to balancing; (b) whether the decision to exclude depends on the speciﬁc right that
has been violated; (c) whether the ofﬁcer’s good faith precludes exclusion;
(d) whether evidence indirectly derived from the original violation is excluded; and
(e) whether exclusion can be invoked by persons whose rights were not directly
violated.
3.1 Ideal Type “System Integrity”
3.1.1 Balancing Interests
If the purpose behind excluding illegally obtained evidence is to preserve or restore
the integrity of the judicial system, declaring inadmissible any evidence acquired in
violation of a procedural rule might be counterproductive because exclusion itself
can jeopardize the (perceived) integrity of the judicial process by leading to verdicts
based on ﬁction rather than truth. Balancing between the interest in basing the
judgment on the totality of available relevant evidence and disregarding items of
evidence whose use would “shock the conscience” seems to be the optimal
approach under this rationale.
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3.1.2 Type of Right Violated
If the integrity of the criminal justice system is the purpose of exclusion, the type of
right violated (e.g., privacy, bodily integrity, secrecy of telecommunications)
should not play a decisive role, because all individual rights protected by applicable
international or domestic law are part of the system and require equal respect. For
the purpose of balancing, it is therefore irrelevant which individual right has been
compromised34; it is only the intensity and scope of the violation that needs to be
considered in the weighing process. Although the right to freedom and the right to
bodily integrity both deserve protection under the “integrity” approach, a statement
made by the defendant at the police station is more likely to be excluded if he was
tortured than if police detained him for an hour longer than was permissible under
the applicable law.
If, however, the ﬁnding of the “truth” is regarded as an important systemic
interest, it matters whether the violation is likely to affect the reliability of the
evidence in question. Accordingly, evidence derived from torture or coercion
should be excluded, whereas violations of other important rights, such as the right
to the privacy of telecommunication, should not necessarily lead to suppression.
Even if the type of right violated should not matter in a system promoting
integrity, it can be argued that the sanction need not always be exclusion, but could
instead vary based on the seriousness of the violation.
3.1.3 Good Faith Exception
The systemic integrity approach weighs the social costs of exclusion and demands
exclusion only where the gravity of the violation outweighs the costs. If a law
enforcement ofﬁcer committed a procedural fault in good faith, for example,
because he relied on a statute or a judicial decision later found to be unconstitu-
tional, or on an innocent misconception of the relevant facts, the evidence obtained
may be the result of a malfunctioning of the legal system as a whole, but the
individual ofﬁcer in question cannot be blamed with having violated the law. There
is thus a lesser taint on the evidence in question, which should weigh in favor of
admission especially if the evidence is needed in order to arrive at a factually
correct judgment. The legal system might be expected to favor exclusion, however,
if the misconduct is due to negligence. For example, where one ofﬁcer relies on the
actions of another ofﬁcer, court administrator, or judge, a “system integrity”
approach might base exclusion of evidence on the fact that at least one government
agent acted against the law. If the ofﬁcer knew that he violated the law or was
reckless as to the legality of his acts, this fact shows a grave defect in the operation
34One might consider affording human dignity a special status; but given the vague contours of
human dignity, a rule of absolute exclusion whenever human dignity had been infringed may lead
to inappropriate results.
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of the criminal justice system and should be a strong argument for exclusion.35 For
less serious breaches, courts following the systemic integrity approach might
impose less drastic remedies, such as declaratory relief or sentence discounts after
conviction.36 For example, Dutch law provides several different remedies for vio-
lations of individual rights by government ofﬁcials, ranging from a mere declaration
of illegality to a sentence reduction and exclusion of the evidence.37
3.1.4 Exclusion of Derivative Evidence
The exclusion of evidence derived from results of an illegal investigatory act (“fruit
of the poisoned tree”) is ambivalent under the “integrity” rationale. On the one
hand, one can argue that the evidence in question (e.g., drugs discovered as a result
of an interrogation conducted without proper warnings) is not tainted by the illicit
path that led to its discovery; therefore, admission of the item—which is of undi-
minished probative value—does not conflict with the ethical integrity of the system.
Under an approach focusing on reliability, admitting evidence that was indirectly
derived from the original violation also makes sense. Such derivative evidence is
generally unlikely to be rendered less reliable on account of a preceding violation.38
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the origin of the chain that leads to
the acquisition of a piece of evidence can be so abhorrent that a system geared
toward integrity should refrain from using it—for example, if the suspect had
disclosed the place where drugs were hidden only after having been brutally tor-
tured. A legal system that places great emphasis on the rule of law would therefore
be inclined to exclude derivative evidence at least in cases of serious violations.
A sensible solution to this dilemma may be to resort to balancing the interests
involved: there should not be an absolute rule of admission or of exclusion, but the
“taint” on the individual item of evidence stemming from the origin of its discovery
should be weighed against its relevance for a just outcome of the process.
35See, e.g., Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138(3) (Austl.); Evidence Act 2006, § 30(3) (N.Z.); R v.
Grant [2009] 2 SCR. 353, §§ 73–75 (Can.); R v. Canale [1990] 91 Cr. App. R. 1 (Eng.); Israel
Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May 2006, CrimA 5121/
98, § 62 (Justice Beinisch).
36See, e.g., R v. Nasogaluak [2007] 229 CCC (3d) 52 (Alta. C.A.); Butler/Butler, 2005 at 1037 §
29.6.5.
37Borgers/StevensLonneke in Thaman, 2013 at 183, 190.
38An exception to this presumption would be a second confession following an initial coerced
confession. Studies of wrongful convictions have shown that, once a person has given a false
confession under pressure from the police, the coercive influence of the ﬁrst confession might lead
to a second false confession, even when police are no longer applying deceptive or coercive
tactics.
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3.1.5 Standing of Persons Other Than the Victim of the Violation
If exclusion of evidence is designed to maintain the integrity of the judicial system,
anybody should be entitled to raise the issue of exclusion. This means that a
defendant should be able to demand exclusion even if only the rights of another
person had allegedly been violated when the evidence was obtained. For example, a
defendant would be able to claim that the search of a witness’s home was illegal and
that therefore contraband found in the home should not be introduced as evidence at
the defendant’s trial. Moreover, it would be consistent with this approach that the
court could (and indeed, should) exclude illegally obtained evidence on its own
motion, even if none of the parties requests exclusion.
3.1.6 Summary
A system justifying exclusion of evidence by the interest of maintaining the
integrity of the judicial process would have these features: The interest in excluding
illegally obtained evidence is weighed against the interest in having a complete
array of relevant evidence available for the judgment.39 There is hence no absolute
rule of exclusion; the degree of the violation and the importance of the individual
rights affected are parts of the balancing process, and so is the question of whether
the item in question has been directly or indirectly obtained through an illegal
method. Questions of standing do not play a role in the decision on exclusion: any
participant in the trial (and indeed, the court) can trigger an examination of possible
exclusion by claiming that a piece of evidence was obtained illegally.
3.2 Ideal Type “Deterrence”
3.2.1 Balancing Interests
If deterrence is the principal goal of exclusion, a categorical approach toward
exclusion seems warranted. Deterrence will work only if law enforcement personnel
are certain that their investigative efforts will be in vain if they resort to forbidden
methods.
On the other hand, a judicial system may balance the interest in deterrence
against other procedural interests, such as that of establishing the truth and of
enforcing the criminal law, thereby carving out different categories of illegal con-
duct. If deterrence outweighs competing considerations (for example, in instances
39If the focus is on promoting the rule of law in systems that have recently moved to liberal
democracy, perhaps there is a greater need for categorical rules because of concerns that a “bal-
anced” exclusionary rule would be toothless.
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of systemic or deliberate misconduct), evidence will invariably be excluded. If, on
the other hand, deterrence beneﬁts are marginal while social costs are signiﬁcant
(for example, where the ofﬁcer has relied in good faith on an illegal warrant issued
by a magistrate), evidence will be admitted.
3.2.2 Type of Right Violated
Under a deterrence approach, the type of right violated should not affect the
decision whether to exclude evidence. The focus in this model is on encouraging
police ofﬁcers to abide by the law, not on the effect that the misconduct has on the
individual. On the other hand, one could argue that if an ofﬁcer is violating only a
minor administrative regulation, deterrence is of lesser importance and exclusion of
evidence would be an over-reaction. Other than in such extreme cases, however,
courts focused on deterrence ought not to differentiate as to the type of the right that
had been violated.
3.2.3 Good Faith Exception
How the deterrence model should view “good faith” violations of the law is a matter
of continued debate. The dominant view is that if an ofﬁcer has acted in “good
faith,” there is no room for deterrence. For example, if the ofﬁcer relied on a statute
or a judicial decision later found to be unconstitutional or on an innocent mis-
conception of the relevant facts, he cannot be blamed for having violated the law,
and there is no conduct from which he needs to be deterred. The need to “punish” a
police ofﬁcer for misconduct is therefore absent or at least strongly reduced if he
acted without fault or was only slightly negligent in the course of investigating the
crime.40 If, on the other hand, the ofﬁcer violated the law deliberately or recklessly,
this is the type of misconduct that merits exclusion of the evidence, because the
ofﬁcer is to learn to abide by the legal norm in the future.41
Some scholars have contested this narrow view of deterrence as being too
focused on individual ofﬁcers rather than on police departments as a whole.42
Commentators have further argued that negligent mistakes can and should be
deterred and that exclusion therefore should not be limited to reckless or deliberate
40United States v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 US 340, 347 (1987); Arizona v.
Evans, 514 US 1, 11 (1995); Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 141 (2009).
41See, e.g., Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 138(3) (Austl.); Evidence Act 2006, § 30(3) (N.Z.); R v.
Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353, §§ 73–75 (Can.); R v. Canale (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 1 (Eng.); Israel
Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May 2006, CrimA 5121/
98, § 62 (Justice Beinisch).
42Levine et al., 2016.
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misconduct.43 Under this view, the threat of exclusion would provide an incentive
for police departments to conduct better training to minimize even negligent errors.
3.2.4 Exclusion of Derivative Evidence
Exclusion of derivative evidence should be favored under the deterrence paradigm,
because police ofﬁcers might be encouraged to employ forbidden methods if they
know that derivative evidence can later be used in order to convict the suspect. If,
however, the link between the violation and the evidence at issue is strongly
attenuated, exclusion may not be warranted for deterring similar violations. For
example, if the police arrest someone unlawfully, the person is subsequently
released, and then returns to the police station to make a voluntary confession, this
statement may be too distant from the unlawful arrest to warrant exclusion44: An
ofﬁcer in a similar situation would not expect that a person would voluntarily return
to make a confession, and therefore is not likely to be deterred from misconduct by
exclusion of the confession.
3.2.5 Standing of Persons Other Than the Victim of the Violation
If exclusion of evidence is designed to deter misconduct, anybody should be
entitled to raise the issue of exclusion, just as under the judicial integrity approach.
3.2.6 Summary
A deterrence-based approach to the exclusion of evidence would have a relatively
strict and categorical approach to exclusion in order to provide clear guidance to
ofﬁcers and minimize the likelihood of misconduct. The type of right violated and
the question whether the item in question was directly or indirectly obtained
through an illegal method would generally not be central to the question of
exclusion, while the offending ofﬁcer’s culpability and the systemic nature of the
misconduct would be. To maximize deterrence of misconduct, any participant in the
trial should have standing to demand exclusion, even if his or her rights were not
directly violated by the action that led to the acquisition of the evidence.
43See, e.g., Lafave, 2009 at 768–70.
44Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 (1963).
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3.3 Ideal Type “Vindication of Individual Rights”
3.3.1 Balancing Interests
In a human rights centered ideal type, exclusion of evidence is a logical and
unavoidable consequence of the violation of a procedural rule protecting the
individual. There is no balancing against procedural interests; to the extent such
interests are taken into consideration, they remain external to the rationale of
exclusion. The only “internal” limit to exclusion would be its waiver by the affected
individual: If the defendant does not object to the introduction of the tainted evi-
dence, there is no reason for excluding it.
3.3.2 Type of Right Violated
Under this rationale, exclusion should ensue only if an individual right has been
affected; a violation of general interests of the procedural system (e.g., the illegal
exclusion of the public from the trial, or the unlawful disclosure of state secrets)
cannot lead to the exclusion of relevant evidence. One could consider gradating
human rights and attaching exclusion only to the violation of those rights deemed
particularly important. But the admission of evidence obtained in violation of any
human right protected by international law or domestic constitutional law would be
difﬁcult to reconcile with this rationale.
3.3.3 Good Faith Exception
From a human rights perspective, it makes little difference whether the ofﬁcer
conducting an unlawful search or interfering with a person’s core privacy acted in
good faith. What counts is the unlawful intrusion by a state agent into the protected
sphere of an individual. A “good faith” exception would thus not be compatible
with a human rights rationale.
3.3.4 Exclusion of Derivative Evidence
If exclusion of evidence is to reinstate the victim of a human rights violation to his
or her prior status and to deprive the state of the fruits of the violation of human
rights, exclusion should extend to the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” Evidence
derived from information obtained by a human rights violation thus should not be
admitted if there exists a clear and direct causal connection between the violation
and the acquisition of the evidence.
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3.3.5 Standing of Persons Other Than the Victim of the Violation
Although rules on standing can be informed by various procedural considerations,
the logic of the human rights rationale suggests limiting standing to the individual
affected by the violation (or his survivors if he was killed).
3.3.6 Summary
In summary, the ideal type of an exclusion system based on a human rights
rationale has these key features: Exclusion of evidence is an invariable consequence
of any violation of an individual human right. Exclusion extends to violations that
occurred unintentionally and also to evidence indirectly derived from the original
violation. Only the individual affected has standing to demand exclusion; he or she
may also waive exclusion, which is binding on the court.
4 Choice of Rationale and Its Consequences
Do real world systems reflect the ideal types described above? Can we detect any
doctrinal patterns based on the rationale adopted? Legal systems do not tend to
subscribe unconditionally to the ideal types as described here. In fact, many
jurisdictions ground their exclusionary rules on more than one rationale. The mix of
rationales—which the law often fails to spell out clearly—makes it difﬁcult to
predict the actual scope of exclusionary rules in any given legal system. Even where
one rationale is dominant, courts and scholars often seek to accommodate sub-
sidiary rationales as well. They may do so expressly by adopting a balancing test, or
indirectly by carving out exceptions to categorical rules. In this section, we examine
to what extent selected legal systems rely on one of the doctrinal bases identiﬁed
above, and how that choice is reflected in the actual features of exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence. For that purpose, we group legal systems along the
three ideal types identiﬁed above, i.e., “system integrity,” “deterrence,” and “human
rights,” and then examine whether their choice of rationale bears on their position
concerning the distinctive issues treated above (Sect. 3).
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4.1 Legal Systems Based on the “System Integrity”
Rationale
Canada and Israel are examples of legal systems that ground their exclusionary rule
on a systemic integrity analysis.45 Consistent with expectations, both systems apply
a multi-factor, balancing test in deciding whether to exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence. Empirical studies of rates of exclusion, however, suggest that the
Canadian balancing test is more robust and more likely to produce exclusion than
the Israeli approach.
Differentiation among various rights occurs in both Canada and Israel.
Although the Canadian Supreme Court has abandoned a previous distinction
between “conscripted” and “non-conscripted” evidence (under which courts were
more likely to suppress evidence where the accused had been “compelled to par-
ticipate in the creation or discovery of the evidence”),46 courts still take the nature
of the right violated into account when assessing the impact of police misconduct
on the interests of the accused.47 As the Canadian Supreme Court elaborated in
Grant, “[t]he more serious the impact on the accused’s interests, the greater the risk
that admission of the evidence may signal to the public that Charter rights, however
high-sounding, are of little actual avail to the citizen, breeding public cynicism and
bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.”48 To determine the serious-
ness of the breach, Canadian courts look to the right violated: Thus “[a]n unrea-
sonable search that intrudes on an area in which the individual reasonably enjoys a
high expectation of privacy, or that demeans his or her dignity, is more serious than
one that does not.”49 In Israel, courts likewise consider the type of right violated in
deciding whether the breach is sufﬁciently serious to outweigh truth-seeking con-
cerns. As the Israeli Supreme Court explained in a seminal case on the exclusionary
rule, “[l]ogic dictates that a technical, negligible or inconsequential violation of the
rules of proper investigation is not the same as a serious breach of these rules
involving a signiﬁcant violation of one of the main basic rights of the person under
investigation.”50
Both Canadian and Israeli courts, as expected, take the good faith of the indi-
vidual police ofﬁcer into consideration when deciding on the exclusion of evidence.
As the Israeli Supreme Court noted, “When the investigation authorities have
intentionally violated the provisions of law that bind them or they have knowingly
45R v. Grant [2009] SCC 32; Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor,
Judgment of 4 May 2006, CrimA 5121/98, §§ 47, 68 (Justice Beinisch).
46Stuart, 2010 at 324.
47R v. Grant [2009] SCC 32, § 76; R v. Harris [2007] ONCA 574, § 63; R. v. Bacchus [2012]
ONSC 5082, §§ 90–93.
48R v. Grant [2009] SCC 32, § 76.
49Id. § 78.
50Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May 2006,
CrimA 5121/98, § 70 (Justice Beinisch).
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violated a protected right of the person under investigation, this is capable of
increasing the seriousness of the violation of the rules of proper investigation and
the possible violation of due process if the evidence is admitted in the trial. Conduct
that involves an intentional violation on the part of the investigation authorities
may, therefore, be a circumstance of considerable weight for declaring the evidence
inadmissible even when the defect is not serious.”51 In deciding how serious a
breach is and what its effects are on systemic integrity, Canadian courts likewise
consider it relevant to determine whether ofﬁcers acted deliberately or recklessly, or
conversely, in good faith.52
It is worth noting, however, that while culpability of the ofﬁcers is relevant, good
faith does not automatically make the resulting evidence admissible in either
Canada or Israel.53 As the Israeli Supreme Court explained, “for example, in cir-
cumstances where the defect that occurred in the manner of obtaining the evidence
was serious and involved a substantial violation of the protected rights of the person
under investigation, then the mere fact that the authority acted in good faith will not
prevent the evidence being excluded.”54
Canadian courts recognize the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, but limit it
in situations where the evidence would have been obtained even if the violation had
not occurred.55 In Israel, by contrast, the courts have entirely rejected the doctrine.56
With regard to the issue of standing, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that
an accused may invoke the exclusionary rule only if the police misconduct affected
his personal right.57 Commentators have argued that this limitation of exclusion is
more consistent with a compensatory, individual rights based approach, rather than
the systemic integrity approach espoused by Canadian courts.58
51Id. § 70.
52R v. Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353, §§ 75, 214 (Can.); Stuart, 2010 at 314, 318; Porter/Kettles, 2012.
53R v. Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353, § 75 (Can.) (“[I]gnorance of [constitutional] standards must not be
rewarded or encouraged and negligence or wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith.”);
R v.Wilson [2003] CarswellOnt 9051 (citing unnamed case in which trial judge excluded evidence
where ofﬁcer relied on an invalid warrant in good faith); R v. R (J.F.R.) [1991] YJ No. 235 (Can.
Yukon Terr. Ct.) (excluding evidence in a case of negligent police violation of the law).
54Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May 2006,
CrimA 5121/98, § 70 (Justice Beinisch).
55R v. Grant [2009] 2 SCR 235 (Can.). Interestingly, the Canadian Court argued that the admission
of evidence that would have been inevitably discovered has a lesser impact on the rights of the
accused—a position criticized by some Canadian scholars; see Stuart, 2010 at 330.
56See, e.g., Israel Supreme Court, Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Judgment of 4 May
2006, CrimA 5121/98, § 71 (Justice Beinisch) (leaving exclusion of derivative evidence to
case-by-case determination).
57R v. Edwards [1996] 1 SCR 128; see also R v. Pasian [2015] ONSC 1557.
58See, e.g., Paciocco, 2011 at 32 (“If the repute of the administration of justice is indeed harmed by
the admission of evidence it must be so whether or not the person whose rights have been violated
complains. And if an objective is to vindicate Charter rights generally and not in the individual
case it makes no sense for the framers of s. 24(2) to have linked the operation of the remedy to an
application by the party whose rights have been violated.”).
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This short overview of two systems that both rely on an integrity approach to
exclusion shows some similarities but also suggests that the same approach can
yield different doctrinal paths. On some of the doctrinal touchstones, the two
systems are in harmony and in line with our expectations, but in other regards both
of them depart from the model of system integrity outlined above.
4.2 Legal Systems Based on the “Deterrence” Rationale
In the United States, the exclusionary rule is based on a deterrence-oriented
analysis. Consistent with the expectation of the model, the U.S. approach is rela-
tively rule-bound and categorical, at least when compared with the more flexible
balancing used in other jurisdictions.59 If the police violate the Constitution, the
exclusionary rule is presumed to apply, unless the prosecution can rely on a speciﬁc
exception.
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has in recent years applied a
cost-beneﬁt analysis, weighing the deterrence beneﬁts of exclusion against its social
costs. This approach has led to the recognition of an increasing number of
exceptions to the exclusionary rule60 and is moving the U.S. away from a purely
deterrence-oriented model toward the system integrity approach discussed in the
previous section.
Concerning the possible differentiation among various rights, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not expressly acknowledged a differential treatment based on the right
violated, yet its jurisprudence shows that mandatory exclusion is more likely to
apply to coerced confessions, unlawful searches of a home, and particularly inva-
sive body searches. By contrast, a cost-beneﬁt analysis is more likely to result in
admitting the tainted evidence when violations of seemingly less important rights—
such as violations of the “prophylactic” Miranda regime—have occurred.61 This
gradation is not fully consistent with a purist deterrence model, which would
generally not distinguish among rights violated.
The U.S. Supreme Court, following the narrow version of the deterrence
approach, has taken the good faith of individual police ofﬁcers into consideration
when deciding on the exclusion of evidence. In Herring v. United States, the
majority opinion explained:
[P]olice conduct must be sufﬁciently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and
sufﬁciently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As
laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.62
59See Levine et al., 2016.
60See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 US 135 (2009).
61Turner, 2019.
62Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 144 (2009).
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The Court has therefore rejected arguments that exclusion can be used more
broadly to encourage police departments to adopt more rigorous training programs
that help prevent even negligent mistakes by police ofﬁcers.63
In line with its emphasis on deterring police misconduct, the U.S. Supreme Court
has traditionally extended exclusion to “evidence obtained from or as a consequence
of lawless ofﬁcial acts.”64 Yet the Court has gradually narrowed the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, recognizing the competing interests at stake. For example, it
has approved the admission of derivative evidence if the connection between the
original violation and the evidence in question has been attenuated (e.g., if an event
has broken the chain of causation between the original illegality and the derivative
evidence).65 The Court also declared derivative evidence admissible if the police
would inevitably have discovered it in the course of its investigation. The Court
justiﬁed these limitations on the exclusionary rule by pointing to the high costs of
excluding probative evidence and the limited deterrent effect of excluding evidence
that either has been or would have been discovered independently by lawful means.66
With regard to the issue of standing, the United States Supreme Court has
limited the right to invoke the exclusionary rule to individuals directly harmed by
the misconduct.67 This limitation cannot be easily squared with the Court’s
emphasis on deterrence. Yet the Court has refrained from extending standing to
third parties, even in cases where it was clear that police intentionally conducted an
unconstitutional search of a person who would not have standing in a criminal case
to move for suppression of the evidence.68
The Supreme Court justiﬁed its narrow approach to standing by citing the sig-
niﬁcant costs of excluding evidence:
Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vin-
dication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier
of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected […]. Since our cases generally have held
that one whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress evidence
obtained in the course of an illegal search and seizure, misgivings as to the beneﬁt of
enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when
deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations.69
63Id. at 173–174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64See Costello v. United States, 365 US 265, 280 (1961).
65Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 603–604 (1975); Murray v. United States, 487 US 533, 537
(1988).
66“If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means—here the volunteers’ search
—then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received. The
requirement that the prosecution must prove the absence of bad faith … wholly fails to take into
account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration
of justice.” Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431, 444–445 (1984).
67Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128, 137–138 (1978); Fisher v. United States, 425 US 391, 397–398
(1976).
68United States v. Payner, 447 US 727 (1980).
69Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128, 137–138 (1978).
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In this context, the Court seems to be mixing rationales, weighing the goal of
truth-seeking, on the one hand, against the goal of deterring misconduct. We thus
see that, like Canada and Israel, the United States is another example of a system
that in practice departs in several respects from the exclusionary model it purports
to follow.
4.3 Legal Systems Based on the Human Rights Rationale
Greece is an example of a legal system regarding exclusion of evidence as a means
of vindicating fundamental individual rights.70 Article 177 § 2 of the Greek Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that evidence obtained through a criminal act must not
be used in court, except in favor of the accused. More speciﬁcally, Article 19 § 3 of
the Greek Constitution in its 2001 version strictly prohibits the use of evidence
obtained through a violation of the secrecy of letters and telecommunication (Art.
19 § 1 Const.), a person’s home or private life (Art. 9 § 1 Const.), or the protection
of personal data (Art. 9A § 1 Const.). The courts have extended the application of
this article to other serious violations of constitutional provisions, such as the use of
torture in violation of Art. 7 § 2 of the Constitution.71 The prohibition of “using”
such illegally obtained evidence applies to: (1) all stages of criminal proceedings;
(2) direct and derivative evidence; (3) evidence obtained by private actors and
evidence obtained by state ofﬁcials; and (4) cases in which a third party’s rights, not
the defendant’s, were violated. The remarkable breadth of exclusion in Greece has
been linked in part to the “bitter, and not-too-distant, experience of rule by military
junta” and in part to the emphasis on fundamental rights.72
Although the Greek system comes close to the ideal type of a human rights
based system, it does not ﬁt the model in all respects. For example, courts have
fashioned broad standing rules that allow third parties to invoke the exclusionary
rule.73 Under a strict individual-rights perspective, this is surprising (see Sects.
3.1.5, 3.2.5 and 3.3.5). But perhaps the broad Greek rule can be explained by the
fact that Greece aims at making sure that no evidence based on human rights
violations will be accepted by the courts, even when this may overcompensate
individual litigants in some cases.
Furthermore, Greek courts have occasionally strayed from the broad rights-based
approach to exclusion. With respect to unlawful wiretaps, for example, the Greek
Supreme Court has held that they “may be used as evidence when they are the only
means for proving innocence, or even guilt, in the case of a very serious crime.”74
70Giannoulopoulos, 2007 at 192, 207–208; see also Kaissis, 2015 at 461–462.
71Spyropoulos/Fortsakis, 2009 at 229.
72Giannoulopoulos, 2007 at 208.
73Id. at 207.
74Triantafyllou, 2013 at 275.
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In departing from the otherwise strict constitutional exclusionary rule, the court
stressed the need for a balance between conflicting interests in the criminal
process.75
Another example of a rights-based approach to exclusion is that of Ireland—at
least, it was until 2015. Irish courts until recently justiﬁed exclusion based on the
courts’ duty: “to protect persons against the invasion of their constitutional rights;
(ii) if invasion has occurred, to restore as far as possible the person so damaged to
the position in which he would be if his rights had not been invaded.”76 Consistent
with an approach based on vindicating individual rights, Irish courts used “one of
the strictest exclusionary rules” in the world: “Where evidence is obtained in breach
of the constitutional rights of a suspect it is subject to automatic exclusion at trial,
unless there are in existence extraordinary excusing circumstances justifying its
admission.”77 The exclusionary rule applied to inadvertent as well as deliberate
violations of the law, and it extended to evidence derived from the original
breach.78 The Irish Supreme Court had rejected a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule on the ground of the “unambiguously expressed constitutional
obligation as ‘far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the
citizen.’”79
Yet after criticism of the broad Irish exclusionary rule by a number of judges and
policymakers, the Irish Supreme Court in 2015 drastically reduced its scope,
holding that an inadvertent breach of the law in the gathering of evidence would not
lead to exclusion.80 The new rule departs from the rights-based rationale of
exclusion and appears to introduce a balancing approach more concerned with
judicial integrity.81
The Greek and Irish systems of exclusion suggest that even seemingly absolute,
rights-oriented approaches to exclusion at times give way to exceptions or bal-
ancing tests.82 As the next section elaborates, the mixing of rationales is perhaps
the most common approach to exclusion in practice.
75Id.
76Trimbole v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1985] IR 550, 573.
77Daly, 2011 at 199; Director of Public Prosecutions v. JC [2015] IESC 31, § 95 (noting that the
previous rule called for “near absolute exclusion” and was “the most extreme” in the common law
world).
78Director of Public Prosecutions v. JC [2015] IESC 31, § 95.
79Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kenny [1990] 2 IR 110, 134 (Ir.); Thaman, 2010 at 352.
80Director of Public Prosecutions v. JC [2015] IESC 31.
81Id. at § 97 (“When does the admission of that evidence itself bring the administration of justice in
to disrepute? This analysis leads inevitably to a more nuanced position which would admit
evidence by reason of a technical and excusable breach, but would exclude it where it was
obtained as a result of a deliberate breach of the Constitution.”); Leon/Ward, 2015 at 593.
82Slobogin, 2016 at 291 (reviewing countries that follow the rights vindication model and ﬁnding
that they undermine the rule-as-vindication rationale in various ways).
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4.4 Mixed Systems
Several legal systems have refrained from deﬁning a single rationale for their
exclusionary rules. Three of the countries discussed in this volume—Switzerland,
Germany, and Taiwan—are examples of such hybrid systems.
The German and Swiss models have been grounded on the need to vindicate
individual rights as well as to protect the rule of law. In Taiwan, the judiciary
introduced an exclusionary rule in 1998, which was subsequently codiﬁed by the
legislature as part of a broader effort to break with the legacy of a decade-long
authoritarian regime. The rule “came about at a time that the new government was
distancing itself from the previous government’s perceived abuse of power …. [T]
he post-martial-law government made a deﬁnitive statement that ‘we are not
them.’”83
The rationale for the Taiwanese exclusionary rules is to protect individual rights
and safeguard the rule of law and judicial integrity.84 While some speciﬁc exclu-
sionary rules—for example, concerning confessions obtained through torture—are
categorical and result in mandatory exclusion, others are flexible and applied on the
basis of a balancing approach. The balancing takes into account a host of factors,
but ultimately aims to weigh the protection of individual rights against the public
interest in the enforcement of criminal law.85
The German and Swiss approaches to exclusion similarly follow a dual
approach, with some rules, such as those pertaining to coerced confessions,
resulting in mandatory exclusion, while others balance the public interest and
individual rights.86
These systems share a tendency toward categorically excluding evidence if
certain very important rights have been violated.87 For example, statements
obtained through torture are mandatorily excluded in most systems studied, and so
are results of violations of a core sphere of privacy. On the other hand, physical
evidence obtained through unlawful searches or seizures is less likely to be
excluded; and the same is true with respect to violations of “administrative” or
“technical” rules.88
Many “mixed” systems take the culpability of the ofﬁcer into account when
deciding on admissibility of evidence. In Taiwan, for example, one factor in the
balancing analysis is “the subjective intentions of the ofﬁcial, i.e., whether the
83Lewis, 2011 at 648; see also Chen, 2011 at 719–720 (noting that the Taiwanese judiciary
adopted the exclusionary rule in an effort to assert its independence and to gain legitimacy by
protecting human rights).
84Lin et al., 2019 at 1.
85Lin et al., 2019.
86Macula, 2019.
87See Thaman, 2013 at 416–417 (discussing exclusionary rules in Spain, Colombia, Brazil,
Portugal, Greece, and Germany); Macula, 2019; Lin et al., 2019.
88See, e.g., Macula, 2019.
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ofﬁcial knows his conduct is unlawful.”89 German courts are also more likely to
exclude evidence where ofﬁcers have purposefully or recklessly violated the law.90
A similar inquiry into the ofﬁcer’s motivation and state of mind occurs with respect
to indirect evidence in Spain.91 It is possible that the consideration of the ofﬁcer’s
state of mind in these systems is a nod to a subsidiary, competing rationale—to
deter police misconduct or to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice system.
We ﬁnd a mixed pattern of solutions with regard to the “fruits of the poisonous
tree” doctrine. In Taiwan, courts extend the exclusionary rule to derivative evi-
dence92 although “evidence acquired by an independent legitimate investigation
shall not be supressed.”93 Spanish,94 German,95 and Swiss96 courts recognize the
doctrine in a limited fashion. Spanish courts use a balancing test to determine
whether to exclude evidence indirectly derived from a breach, and the ofﬁcer’s state
of mind in committing the breach is an important factor.97 In Switzerland and
Germany, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is used for some violations, but
the courts recognize a “hypothetical clean path” exception, which is interpreted
quite broadly.98
With regard to standing, Germany pursues a strict approach, insisting that only
the person whose rights were violated can invoke the exclusionary rule. For
example, the Federal Court of Justice ruled that a defendant cannot demand the
exclusion of the incriminating statement of a witness who had not been informed of
his privilege against self-incrimination when interrogated by the police.99
89Lin et al., 2019 at 3.1.3.
90Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Judgment of 18 April 2007, 51
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 285, 2007 (Ger.) (upholding exclusion where
the police “intentionally circumvented the protective warrant requirement”);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], Judgment of 9 November 2011, [2011]
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2417 (Ger.) (stating that evidence would be excluded “if there has
been a grave, conscious, or arbitrary violation of procedural law which infringed upon the protection
of an individual’s fundamental rights in a planned or systematic fashion”). One of us has noted a trend
toward exclusion in recent German decisions, “especially where important individual rights have been
violated and the law enforcement ofﬁcer acted without good faith.”; Weigend, 2015 at 195.
91Bachmaier Winter, 2013 at 216–217.
92Lin et al., 2019 at 3.2.6.
93Lin et al., 2019 at 3.2.6.2 (quoting Supreme Court decision 102 taishangzih No. 4177 (最高法院
102年度台上字第4177號判決)).
94Bachmaier Winter, 2013 at 232.
95Gless, 2013 at 128.
96Macula, 2019.
97Bachmaier Winter, 2013 at 232.
98Macula 2019; Weigend, 2019 (in this volume) German report at notes 98 et seq.
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5 Conclusion: Aligning Doctrines with Rationales?
Looking at our ﬁndings from a comparative standpoint, the rationales that different
systems rely upon do not fall into an expected pattern. No clear divide exists
between adversarial and inquisitorial systems. A trend we do identify, however, is
that for most systems, particularly those that have adopted exclusionary rules rel-
atively recently, the dominant rationales for exclusionary rules are to protect
individual rights and promote judicial integrity rather than to deter misconduct or
promote the search for truth. This development can probably be attributed to the
growing influence of international human rights law and to an emphasis on the rule
of law in countries transitioning away from authoritarian regimes.
Not surprisingly, we have not encountered a legal system that exactly mirrors
one of the ideal types construed in section 3. To begin with, virtually all the
countries we examined pursue more than one goal when excluding evidence, even
if one objective may be dominant; and the majority of systems rely on a mix of
rationales to support their exclusionary rules.
But even where a legal system expresses a pronounced orientation toward a
“human rights” or a “deterrence” rationale, such as Greece and the United States,
respectively, the choice of rationale does not necessarily seem to determine the
resolution of the key issues we have identiﬁed. Of course, quite a few of our
ﬁndings comport with the ideal-typical models. The emphasis on protecting indi-
vidual rights has led countries such as Greece, Ireland, and Russia to adopt—at least
on paper—broad and categorical exclusionary rules; and “hybrid” systems such as
Germany and Switzerland have embraced a broad balancing approach designed to
make it possible to ﬁnd compromise between conflicting interests in each case.
Contrary to expectations, however, the United States—although oriented toward
deterring police misconduct—limits standing to persons directly affected by the
violation that led to the evidence, whereas Greece—although professing adherence
to a “human rights” rationale—grants standing to individuals who were not per-
sonally affected by the human rights violation in question. On the other hand,
adopting the same rationale does not necessarily lead to identical doctrines of
exclusion, as can be seen from the examples of Israel and Canada. Instead, one and
the same rationale can justify a variety of approaches to exclusion, from balancing
to categorical exclusion and from relatively narrow to relatively broad rules.
These variations can easily be explained by the fact that even legal systems
which emphasize a single basic rationale for exclusion reasonably take other con-
siderations and interests into account when shaping rules on individual issues.
Certain overriding considerations appear to influence exclusionary decision-making
to a larger extent than adherence to basic rationales. For example, legal systems are
most likely to use absolute exclusionary rules with respect to violations of certain
fundamental rights, such as the right not to be subjected to torture. When rationales
coincide, and especially when the truth-seeking rationale weighs on the side of
exclusion, legal systems are most likely to exclude evidence.
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Policy considerations can also be expected to have a great influence on the
design of actual exclusionary rules. For example, legal systems that regard police
misconduct as a serious problem—such as the United States in the 1960s and 1970s
—can be expected to establish broad exclusionary rules but to limit them to
bad-faith disregard of citizens’ procedural rights; systems which have faith in police
to obey the legal rules will see less need to shape their exclusionary rules in order to
achieve deterrence.
In sum, we can say that a strict doctrinal adherence to particular rationales and
purposes of exclusion of evidence plays a lesser role in the construction and
application of exclusionary rules when compared to considerations of fairness,
procedural expediency, and an interest in keeping a balance between the
truth-orientation and the rights-orientation of the criminal process. The ofﬁcial
purposes of excluding evidence are of course welcome arguments for supporting
individual sub-rules and court decisions; but they are not determinative. Judges who
shape and apply legal rules in difﬁcult areas do not simply apply doctrines but take
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